Officials at the Ministry of Mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo have revealed that imposter president Félix Tshisekedi’s offer to President Donald Trump for Congolese mining rights in a exchange of military reinforcement was a hoax.
The officials who spoke on condition of anonymity say Tshisekedi was making wild offers in a desperate attempt to save his presidency.
AFC/M23 liberators have captured a huge part of Congo including Goma in North Kivu and Bukavu in South Kivu and are threatening to moving into Kinshasa to overrall Tshisekedi.
In panic, Tshisekedi has turned to President Donald Trump to save his collapsing regime but officials have warned the Americans not to fall in the trap.
“All the mines are gone. They’re owned by different companies some of them from China. So, it will be chaos and serious legal battles will emerge. President Trump must stay away,” the official warned.
Meanwhile, the African Confidential reports that Tshisekedi has been pulling out all
the stops to buy time since Rwandan-backed rebels captured
swathes of territory in eastern DRC. He hopes that offering
mining projects will win him support from the US and the
United Arab Emirates.
DR Congo officials were urgently dispatched to the United States last month to
offer Donald Trump’s administration a share of their country’s vast mineral
resources in exchange for Washington putting pressure on Kigali.
Among the officials who travelled across the Atlantic included Gécamines
officials. Guy Robert Lukama, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the state-
owned mining company, was named by several sources, although he denied
this to Africa Intelligence, saying he had no involvement in the matter. Also
mentioned were Patrick Luabeya, the head of the ARECOMS strategic
minerals markets authority. Prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka was
represented by Finance Minister Doudou Fwamba Likunde, while the
presidency sent the head of state’s brother Jacques Tshisekedi to discuss
security issues.
The Congolese government’s hastily devised strategy is modelled on the
Ukrainian example. It is motivated by fear of a collapse of power in Kinshasa
and by parallel discussions between Washington and Kigali that would be to
the DRC’s detriment. While the list of assets that Kinshasa has put up for sale
remains uncertain, some groups with a presence in the former Greater
Katanga region are already looking to take advantage of the situation to get a
foothold. This is the case of Dubai-based Shalina Resources, whose sale of its
Chemaf subsidiary to China’s Norin Mining was blocked by Gécamines (AI,
03/07/24).
Kinshasa’s proposal, the details of which remain unclear, has received a mixed
reception within the US administration. Several US officials, including Peter
Pham, who is still waiting for the go-ahead from the Senate to become Under-
Secretary of State for African Affairs, as well as Trump’s special envoy on
“special files” Richard Grenell, make no secret of their lack of confidence in
the Congolese government.
Kinshasa is also working to mitigate the collapse of its security apparatus after
the rout of its army this year in North and South Kivu provinces. It wants to
buy time to recover and recoup before possible negotiations with the M23
and Paul Kagame’s Rwanda.
It is with this in mind that Jacques Tshisekedi, after his US trip, visited the
United Arab Emirates to urgently organise the delivery of military equipment.
He was accompanied by the president’s private adviser, Kahumbu
Mandungu Bula, aka Kao, who acts as an intermediary between Félix
Tshisekedi and UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbZ).
The Congolese officials, who stayed at the Four Seasons hotel on Al Maryah
Island as they moved between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, met with officials from
the powerful International Holding Co (IHC), which is run by national
security adviser Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the brother of MbZ.
They
mentioned the recent availability of a mining site in Lualaba province in
southeastern DRC. The site is believed to be the Musonoï East copper and
cobalt deposit near Kolwezi, which is believed to have considerable reserves.
The site is owned by Gécamines and was the subject of a memorandum of
understanding concluded in July 2021 with the South African Robert
Gumede’s Guma Group. Gumede is a regular in the circles of power in
Kinshasa, where he is reputed to be close to former finance minister Nicolas
Kazadi. He has in recent years gravitated around negotiations in the DRC that
involve arms components. According to several sources, Kao and the
President’s brother have asked for at least $250m in advance in order to
obtain it.
On 4 February, a few days after the capture of Goma, Gécamines managing
director Placide Nkala Basadilua sent a letter to Gumede, which Africa
Intelligence has seen, to announce the end of the memorandum of
understanding on the Musonoï East site.
He said that decision was taken after the failure of negotiations started in
December 2023 to revive the mining project. The letter ended by saying that
“Gécamines cannot leave this perimeter immobilised any longer and is forced
to close this phase of discussions”.
Kinshasa is also exploring other options, including help from Russia.
Tshisekedi’s diplomacy has been resolutely pro-Western since he came to
power in 2019, but he nevertheless sent his adviser Théo Mbiye to Moscow
last month to sound out the Kremlin’s position.
Mbiye has worked on mining issues in the former Grand Katanga area for
some time and, in particular, on the thorny matter of the Eurasian Resources
Group (AI, 28/11/24). The news of his trip to Moscow fuelled talk of mining
concessions being granted to Russian firms. Mbiye did not respond when
contacted by Africa Intelligence.
But it appears that Russia, already heavily involved in Ukraine, is unwilling to
get involved in the Congolese issue. This has not prevented Kinshasa from
turning to one of Moscow’s main allies in Africa, the Malian junta led by
Assimi Goïta. Congolese Justice Minister Constant Mutamba travelled to
Bamako on 22 February, after attending a meeting in Dakar of the
Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa, to deliver
a personal message to Goïta on behalf of Tshisekedi.
The DR Congo, aware of its relative diplomatic isolation on the continent, is
also hoping for support from one of its few African allies, Chad, which
Tshisekedi knows well as he acted as a facilitator of the Economic
Community of Central African States on the political transition in the
country. He delivered a personal message on 18 February to Chadian
leader Mahamat Idriss Déby via his Regional Integration Minister Didier
Mazenga Mukanzu.
A team of Congolese military experts then travelled to N’Djamena to discuss
possible military support for Kinshasa. But the Chadians, who had seriously
considered this in order to foster rapprochement between the two countries,
now seem reluctant to commit. The army’s general staff in particular has advised against a bilateral intervention.
The prospect of deploying a
contingent in eastern Congo, which is very different from the Chadian army’s
usual theatres of operation, would mean overcoming considerable logistical
challenges.
Ndayishimiye U-turn feared
Only Burundi has so far maintained a significant military force to block the
M23. Some 10,000 Force de Défense Nationale du Burundi (FDNB) soldiers
had been deployed in eastern Congo until February.
But the M23 offensive led
Burundi to withdraw many of them to secure its border, before redeploying
them in recent days to positions north of the town of Uvira, which is
threatened by the rebels.
Kinshasa, which contributes financially to the deployment of Burundian
forces, nevertheless fears a possible volte-face by President Évariste
Ndayishimiye.
These concerns were rekindled by the arrival in Kigali in mid-
February of Burundian securocrats to discuss a de-escalation of tensions
between the two countries. These exchanges lent credence to the theory, on
the Congolese side, that Gitega had made a verbal agreement with Kigali to
avoid confrontation, particularly in Uvira, in the immediate vicinity of
Bujumbura.
Ndayishimiye has reaffirmed his support for Kinshasa, but he is aware of the
turmoil within his army, where some senior officers are questioning the
merits of the FDNB’s operation on Congolese territory. This is all the more so
since the Burundian army suffered heavy losses in January during clashes in
Ngungu in North Kivu.
