Tax filings in Romania have revealed that Democratic Republic of Congo government under imposter president Felix Tshisekedi paid mercenaries as much as $20, 000 each to fight in east Congo.
Last month, the mercenaries were captured by AFC/M23 liberators and kicked out of Congo like dogs.
Since their capture and eventual return to Romania, the mercenaries have been under investigation by their own government.
Meanwhile, the New York Times reports that the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has entered a new and more destabilizing stage.
A call for a pause in the fighting by leaders from the 8 member states of the East African Community (EAC) and 16 member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was dismissed by Rwandan-backed M23 rebel forces, who have continued their offensive to seize more territory in the eastern DRC.
Following their taking of Goma (population of 2 million) and Bukavu (population 1.3 million), the respective capitals of North and South Kivu Provinces, the M23 has pressed farther south, capturing Kamanyola on its way to Uvira (population of 650,000), the third largest city in the Kivus. Another prong moved north of Goma toward Butembo (population of 280,000).
With the prospect of the M23 controlling the entirety of the 124,000 km2 of the mineral-rich Kivus, Rwanda would effectively be gaining a territory nearly five times its size.
Nor would this necessarily be the culmination of Rwanda’s territorial ambitions. Tensions have already started surfacing in Kisangani (in north central DRC) and Lubumbashi (in the south of the country) following the M23’s threats to push all the way to Kinshasa.
The Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) are not providing much resistance to M23 advances. Burundian forces, numbering around 10,000 in South Kivu, have reportedly started withdrawing after M23 rebels overran Kavumu Airport and the adjacent air force base on their way to Bukavu. The proximity of the fighting to Bujumbura, just across the DRC border, risks leading to a direct confrontation between Burundian and Rwandan troops.
Ugandan forces, meanwhile, have also entered the DRC and seized Bunia (population of 900,000), the capital of Ituri Province. The aim of the Ugandan deployment is ostensibly to counter the wantonly violent criminal group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which has been menacing communities on both sides of the Ugandan-DRC border for years.
However, the M23’s simultaneous drive towards Butembo enroute to Bunia has raised suspicions of potential coordination between the M23, Rwanda, and Uganda.
Top Ugandan generals and senior government advisors have commented favorably on the M23’s cause and narrative, a markedly different tone than when the M23 seized Goma back in 2012.
During the battle for Goma in January 2025, a firefight between the M23 and SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) forces, who were in the DRC to help contain the M23 threat, led to the deaths of 20 soldiers from South Africa, Malawi, and Tanzania. About 1,300 SAMIDRC troops remain confined to their bases in Goma and Sake under the watch of M23 fighters after negotiating a ceasefire. The deaths and the potential of Rwanda gaining leverage over its giant neighbor have further accentuated the regional tensions underlying this conflict.
The DRC’s already dire humanitarian situation has been worsened with the population displacements caused by M23 advances. More than 500,000 people in the Kivus were displaced as a result of the M23’s latest push. There are now an estimated 7 million Congolese displaced within the country, the majority in the eastern provinces.
The United Nations (UN) estimates that 3,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed during the M23’s attack on Goma, underlying the degree of violence employed.
Many say the death toll is much higher. The risk of mass atrocities is also high in a region where predation by rebels, militias, and government forces is common. The UN has warned of surging child recruitment, abductions, killings, and sexual violence.
As the fighting expands, these human costs as well as wider instability for the entire region are likely to escalate. The First and Second Congo Wars are estimated to have resulted in the deaths of 5.4 million people and economic costs in the DRC alone of more than $11 billion (or 29 percent of its GDP at the time).
A Regionalized Crisis
The M23 is advancing faster than previous insurgencies from the east during the First (1996–1997) and Second Congo Wars (1998–2003), with the possibility that they could attempt to march on Kinshasa.
A ceasefire may require the deployment of a multinational AU observer force comprised of countries acceptable to all belligerents. A ceasefire would need to be supported by the resumption and merging of the Luanda and Nairobi negotiating processes to realize a longer term resolution. This would entail a verifiable agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, backed by a joint commission to monitor commitments.
This could be modelled after the South African-mediated Pretoria Agreement in 2002 that paved the way for Rwanda’s exit from the DRC and a mechanism for joint operations with the Congolese government to address the FDLR.
Lessons, too, can be drawn from the 1999 Lusaka Agreement, which orchestrated the cessation of hostilities from the First Congo War, including a process for the orderly withdrawal of external actors and a mechanism to pursue disarmament and reintegration of former combatants into the Congolese military.
A multinational African guarantor mechanism with international backing would likely be a critical element of such an agreement to provide assurances to all sides that commitments are being upheld.
The solutions to the DRC’s complex problems are to be found within the Congolese experience but must be backed up by African support and engagement to be realized—and to avert the enormous costs to the continent generated by previous conflicts in the DRC.
Its soldiers are underpaid and underarmed. Its ranks are riddled with factions pursuing their own interests. And successive presidents are said to have kept it weak for fear of a coup.
The Democratic Republic of Congo’s army has appeared too weak and dysfunctional to stop a militia that has swept through the eastern part of the country in recent weeks. The militia, called M23, has seized two major cities, two strategic airports and large stretches of Congolese territory.
Félix Tshisekedi, the president, tried to prepare for this moment, strengthening his military to squash the thousands of fighters roaming in the east. But that response has crumbled in the face of the M23 advance, leaving Mr. Tshisekedi increasingly isolated, his domestic support evaporating, peace talks with regional powers stalled and strong international support lacking.
M23 is backed by Rwanda, Congo’s much smaller neighbor whose troops have trained, armed and embedded with the rebels, according to the United Nations. Rwanda has acknowledged that its troops are in Congo but denied controlling M23.
“This conflict has two sides,” said Fred Bauma, the executive director of Ebuteli, a Congolese research institute. “One is Rwandan support to the M23. And the other one is internal weaknesses of the Congolese government.”
In a recent interview with The New York Times, Congo’s president said the army’s problem was that it had been infiltrated by foreigners, and blamed his predecessor for failing to address the problem.
“My predecessor spent 18 years in power without rebuilding the army,” Mr. Tshisekedi said. “When we started to overhaul and rebuild it in 2022, we were immediately attacked by Rwanda, as if they wanted to prevent the reforms.”
Over the past month, those attacks have accelerated, and the Congolese army and its allies — which include European mercenaries and armed groups known as the Wazalendo, or Patriots — have lost battle after battle.
M23 is pushing into new territory, surrounding the city of Uvira, and marching both north and south. In Bukavu, Congolese soldiers retreated in long columns before M23 had even attacked the city.
After a battle for the city of Goma, M23 fighters loaded hundreds of captured troops into trucks and drove them out of the city for retraining. Police officers have also surrendered en masse and joined M23, according to a rebel spokesman. Congolese soldiers and their Wazalendo allies have frequently turned on each other, fighting over supplies and access to locations where they are accused of extracting bribes.
