The Democratic Republic of the Congo has presented U.S. officials and the American people with a proposal: help bring security to the embattled central African country and, in return, receive access to valuable mineral deposits.
Given President Trump’s push for a minerals deal with Ukraine, the framing is a tactful move. While such an agreement could help undercut China’s domination in the minerals space, American leaders should ask if it is worth the risk it poses to U.S. service members and companies.
That nation has several key minerals that the U.S. identifies as “critical” due to their use in technologies ranging from smartphones to defense systems vital for national security. However, U.S. officials negotiating with Democratic Republic of the Congo should minimize the risks of a partnership, clearly define American mineral needs and explore possible alternatives to make sure that any deal is worth the cost.
Crucially, the preliminary Congolese proposal outlined several provisions that would almost certainly require the presence of American forces in the country. They would be needed to address the rapidly strengthening Rwandan-backed M23 rebellion, which recently captured two provincial capitals in the country’s far east and aims to topple the Congolese government.
To confront this threat, the initial Congolese offer envisions U.S. bases to protect “strategic resources,” and “security cooperation” with the U.S., replacing the role of 14,000 United Nations peacekeepers in the eastern region of the country.
Putting American forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo would put service members at risk. There is a reason thousands of U.N. peacekeepers are already present.
This region of the country is highly insecure, and the Rwandan Army, one of the most effective and modern forces on the continent, is fighting alongside M23. Six U.N. peacekeepers and 14 South African troops were killed in fighting involving M23 earlier this year. The Islamic State affiliate based in the area would also undoubtedly relish the prospect of American targets close by.
These risks are exacerbated by a security environment sown with the seeds of a “forever war” — rampant graft and poorly trained local partners. Corruption, divided loyalties and patronage networks among the Congolese army have limited the effectiveness of decades of reform and training efforts.
Similar corruption infects the Congolese government. Its fractiousness also increases the risk that the president will be deposed, which would throw a U.S. partnership into limbo.
For these reasons, U.S. officials should consider alternative security solutions that do not risk American lives. Stronger international sanctions against M23 sponsor Rwanda may help address short-term Congolese concerns.
The U.S. could also turn to military contractors for some of the work of securing sites or training Congolese forces. However, these alternatives would not address Congo’s systemic and long-term security issues, and the U.S. may have to compete against offers from Russia and the United Arab Emirates.
Beyond the risk to U.S. service members, any deal with Congo would require substantial American investment. The preliminary Congolese proposal expanded beyond mineral access to include offers of a deep-water port and mineral stockpile. Between 2000 and 2021, the Chinese government and state-owned institutions loaned Chinese mining companies in Congo $14.7 billion.
This strategic investment subsidized risky mining investments to operationalize mines and billions more bankrolled the transportation infrastructure needed to export the minerals back to China for refining.
The U.S. would need to make similar sacrifices to meet goals to incentivize private investment, especially given that China can further suppress profits by manipulating the price of key minerals using its stockpiles and illegal involvement in cheap artisanal mining. Key American institutions like the Export-Import Bank and Development Finance Corporation would need to significantly increase their role in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of this effort.
Beyond raw finances, the U.S. must also confront the corruption in the Congolese government to decrease risk and increase investment. The money raised through mining concession bribes and arbitrary taxes is often part of the informal patronage networks that underpin the Congo’s weak institutions. China games this corruption, increasing costs and legal liability for U.S. companies in the process.
The ultimate value of a deal comes down to how urgently the U.S. needs the critical minerals the Congo has to offer in greatest supply: cobalt, copper and tantalum.
The U.S. relies on imports for all its tantalum, more than three-quarters of its cobalt consumption, and nearly half of its copper. Copper demand is expected to double by 2030, but forecasts may decrease if the Trump administration decides to deprioritize green energy. Substitution and recycling efforts continue to improve the resiliency of tantalum and cobalt supply chains, albeit with drawbacks and vulnerabilities.
President Trump’s efforts to boost domestic copper production may further help address part of the projected copper gap. The Congo also possesses deposits of lithium, niobium, tin and tungsten, but those account for less than 10 percent of global production and reserves.
Other nations have minerals too, and the U.S. should consider whether alternative suppliers offer a better deal. China already legally owns or holds stakes in 15 of the largest Congolese copper and cobalt mines, which could limit how much, how quickly and how cheaply the U.S. is able to benefit from alternative sites in the country.
Tantalum projects are being explored in Canada, South America and several countries across Africa. Chile and Peru are the two other largest copper producers, and they may have fewer risks than Congo. Australia also has significant reserves of cobalt, copper and tantalum, but exploring reserves is a much more long-term solution.
The U.S. should evaluate these tradeoffs within the context of a broader critical mineral strategy to negotiate a worthwhile deal. American leaders have identified critical minerals as a key issue but failed to enact a comprehensive approach to fully secure supply chains.
The Congolese proposal is not a silver bullet, and these discussions should be a wake-up call for American officials. China will still dominate the refining of many elements found in Congo-Kinsasha if the U.S. does not find additional partners.
The U.S. should develop a comprehensive critical minerals strategy and seek out partnerships that best suit this strategy, not build a strategy around external offers. A lack of strategic vision will lead to costly failures.
Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute.
CREDIT: The Hill
